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As the level of automation within an aircraft increases, the interactions between the 
pilot and autopilot play a crucial role in its proper operation. Issues with human machine 
interactions (HMI) have been cited as one of the main causes behind many aviation 
accidents. Due to the complexity of such interactions, it is challenging to identify all 
possible situations and develop the necessary contingencies. In this thesis, we propose 
a data-driven analysis tool to identify potential HMI issues in large-scale Flight Oper-
ational Quality Assurance (FOQA) dataset. The proposed tool is developed using a 
multi-level clustering framework, where a set of basic clustering techniques are com-
bined with a consensus-based approach to group HMI events and create a data-driven 
model from the FOQA data. The proposed framework is able to effectively compress a 
large dataset into a small set of representative clusters within a data-driven model, en-




Advances in flight automation have reallocated aircraft operations away from the 
pilots, consequently moving them into a supervisory role within the cockpit [1]. The 
ritualistic efficiency of autopilot systems has brought about sweeping improvements in 
safe operations of aircraft; however, effective interactions between the pilot and auto-
pilot are paramount for this claim to hold true. In many aviation accidents, investigators 
have identified improper human machine interactions (HMI) as the source of the ca-
lamity [2, 3]. While HMI issues may occur due to a range of reasons, each case is char-
acterized by the basic principle that the automation and the operator intend to perform 
different actions [4, 5]. While formal model checking tools are used during the devel-
opment of autopilot systems, it is not feasible for such tools to identify all the problems 
stemming from HMI issues for two main reasons [6, 7]: First, due to the complexity of 
a pilot’s decision making process, it is challenging to identify and check for all points 
of interaction between the pilot and autopilot. Second, since automation logic is defined 
in discrete states, it is challenging to incorporate the impacts of continuous flight states 
(i.e. altitude, speed, heading, etc.) in model checkers [8, 9]. Due to the difficulty of 
using model checking techniques to identify sources of HMI issues, research has also 
been conducted in taking data driven approaches to identify HMI issues via anomaly 
detection [1-16]. By looking at large-scale flight dataset, these techniques attempt to 
find unusual trends in flight data. Via the identification of anomalies in regular flights, 
it may be possible to recognize instances of HMI issues. While such instances may not 
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have caused a safety related issue, by identifying and correcting them it may be possible 
to deter future risk of incidents. The objective of this thesis is to develop a new data-
driven tool based on data mining techniques to 1) detect HMI issues from a large-scale 
flight data, 2) classify the detected HMI issues along their characteristics, and 3) build 
a model describing the patterns of the classified HMI issues.  
This thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 1, the approach used to identify con-
flicts is detailed and intent conflicts observed in FOQA data discussed. Chapter 1 de-
scribes the clustering process proposed to effectively group intent conflict data. The 
process to represent clustered intent conflict data as a data-driven model is outlined in 
Chapter 1. The analysis results from applying the proposed algorithms to FOQA data 
are presented in Chapter 1. The conclusions are discussed in Chapter 1. 
1.1 Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) Program 
The FOQA program was first introduced by the FAA in 2004 as a way to improve 
the safety of the commercial airline industry via the voluntary sharing of de-identified 
flight data [10]. The flight data submitted to the FOQA program is the detailed flight 
information that is recorded on a Flight Data Recorder (FDR) or a Quick Access Re-
corder (QAR). As per the program guidelines, the minimum flight parameters that need 
to be submitted are equivalent to the mandated requirements for FDRs [11, 12]. In the 
most general sense recorded data can be of two types, continuous or discrete. Continu-
ous state data represent time varying parameters such as flight speed, heading, roll rate, 
etc. Discrete state data represent categorical states such as autopilot modes, button 
presses, switch positions, etc. Due to the high rates of participation and the depth of the 
collected data, a number of techniques have been developed to analyze FOQA data. 
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The next subsection will go into some of the methods that have been developed to an-
alyze FOQA data for the purpose of identifying anomalous behavior including HMI 
issues. For the purpose of this thesis, FOQA data from 151,083 flights in NASA’s 
DASHlink database is analyzed.  
1.2 Review of Related Work 
The most direct approach for identifying anomalous behavior in FOQA data, out-
lined in [1], is to first identify ranges in flight parameters for nominal behavior during 
a flight and detect outliers that fall outside normal operational bounds. Such an ap-
proach uses simple clustering analysis to identify the outlying flights based on the as-
sumption that the majority of the flights within the dataset are normal. While this 
method is effective in identifying anomalous flights, this process is limited to flights 
that share similar flight plans and aircraft properties; hence, it must be individually ap-
plied to different routes, aircraft types, weather conditions, etc. Additionally, this ap-
proach will only able to find anomalous behavior at a macro scale, thus overlooking 
small inconsistencies in flight parameters or intermittent issues of short duration which 
do not cause a major variation in the overall flight. Furthermore, this approach can an-
alyze only continuous flight parameters, excluding discrete state information critical to 
understanding HMI events. 
An alternate approach, used in [14], analyzes sequences of discrete states to identify 
anomalous behavior. Contrary to the previous approach, clustering techniques are ap-
plied to only the discrete sequences in flight data (i.e. autopilot modes or pilot interac-
tions) to identify nominal sequences of discrete states. Flights containing any abnormal 
sequence of events, and the associated aberrant parameter sequences, can be identified. 
This approach is limited to examining similar flights and aircraft as discrete sequences 
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can vary greatly depending on the route, airports, and equipment. This approach can 
indeed identify inconsistences in the pilot or autopilot discrete actions but is unable to 
couple them with other continuous flight parameters.  
The algorithm discussed in [15] incorporates discrete state information along with 
continuous data to identify anomalous flights using their proposed Multiple Kernel 
Anomaly Detection (MKAD) algorithm. The MKAD is able to combine information 
from both continuous and discrete states, which enables it to account for the more com-
plex behavior of the pilot and autopilot when identifying anomalies. That being said, 
this approach also uses the concept of nominal behavior to identify outliers, limiting 
the type of flights that can be analyzed together and the scope of the analysis results.  
Rather than looking at anomalies in overall flights, our earlier work [16] suggests 
the use of an intent model to identify HMI issues during instances of a flight. Anoma-
lous behavior is detected within the flight data by first inferring the intent of the pilot 
and the autopilot. An intent conflict is said to have taken place if there is a mismatch in 
the pilot’s and autopilot’s intents, i.e. the pilot and the autopilot are attempting to per-
form disparate actions. As this approach looks at flight data one flight at a time using 
an intent model, the anomalies detected are independent of each other. This allows the 
algorithm to process different types of aircraft and is not limited to a set of similar 
flights with comparable flight plans.  
With any of the techniques discussed above, the detected anomalies are not guaran-
teed to be HMI events. To identify an anomaly as an HMI issue, it must be examined 
by an SME and confirmed as such. The intent based anomaly detection technique, dis-
cussed in [16], attempts to target HMI events by specializing on the type of anomalies 
to look for. Since intents are identified by building models of the pilot and the autopilot, 
anomalies detected in such a manner have an advantage over the previously discussed 
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blanket approaches. Rather than statistical anomalous behavior, intent conflicts repre-
sent behavior that is aberrant as a result of pilot and autopilot actions during the flight. 
Therefore, identified intent conflicts represent anomalies that are more likely to be re-
lated to HMI events. However, while this intent based approach can detect instances of 
potential HMI issues, it is unable to provide trends and causes behind the issues. For 
the remainder of this thesis, the algorithm outlined in [16] is referred to as the intent 
conflict detection algorithm.  
1.3 Motivations 
When the intent conflict detection algorithm [16] is applied to a large-scale FOQA 
data set, a large number of intent conflict events are detected. Due to the variations in 
the complex nature of HMI events, it is challenging to analyze and isolate the source of 
the intent conflict algorithmically. To identify the causality that resulted in each of these 
events, they must be analyzed by subject matter experts (SMEs). However, due to the 
substantial size of the intent conflict dataset, manual examination by experts is infeasi-
ble.  
In this thesis, we propose techniques that can process large sets of event data and 
make it possible for experts to analyze such events efficiently as a group. We suggest 
the use of clustering techniques to analyze this intent conflict data and propose a multi-
step clustering method to achieve this. By identifying trends and patterns in intent con-
flict events, we aim to systematically reduce the amount of intent conflict data that must 
be examined by SMEs as they attempt to discover the causality behind intent conflicts. 
The proposed framework is built upon a consensus clustering approach [17], tradition-
ally used to combine and improve results of other clustering algorithms [18]. In this 
thesis, we propose a new framework for applying consensus clustering to effectively 
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and efficiently group and characterize intent conflict events. The proposed approach is 
able to incorporate both discrete and continuous state information.  
Owing to the sheer number of aircraft that are flown on a daily basis, an increasing 
number of intent conflict events may be occurring. Therefore, it is important that intent 
conflict events are actively tracked and managed. To enable this, we also propose the 
creation of a structured data-based model that can adapt to and be updated with new 
flight data. This model structures the intent conflict clusters, obtained by the proposed 
consensus clustering algorithm, into networks. As new data is added to the system, the 
network is able to evolve based on the creation of new nodes and links. The proposed 
clustering and modeling techniques can be used to build useful clusters based on trends 
identified among intent conflict events. Additionally, this results in a significantly more 
manageable size of data for manual examination, making it possible for SMEs to effi-




2. INTENT BASED HMI DETECTION 
This chapter briefly reviews the intent conflict detection approach that we have de-
veloped in [16]. The FOQA data is processed by the intent conflict detection algorithm 
to identify instances in flight where intent conflicts occur.  
The algorithm first models the behaviors of the pilot and autopilot using a set of 
flight intents. For example, the flight intents can be climb, descend or maintain altitude 
in the vertical dimension; turn left, turn right or maintain heading in the horizontal di-
mension; and speed up, slow down or maintain speed in the speed dimension. Then, the 
algorithm uses intent inference techniques to infer the flight intents of the pilot and 
autopilot from the given FOQA data. An instant of intent conflict is then said to occur 
when the inferred intents of the of the pilot and autopilot do not align, and can occur in 
a range of manners as illustrated in Figure 2-1, and elaborated in section 1.1. In the first 
case of Figure 2-1, an intent conflict occurs because the autopilot enters the altitude 
hold state temporarily. In the second case, an intent conflict occurs due to a delay in the 
pilot for changing the intent from descend to hold. In the third scenario, the pilot intends 
to climb while the autopilot descend.  
 
Figure 2-1. Different types of intent conflicts in the vertical dimension  
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2.1 Types of Intent Conflicts  
The intent conflict algorithm detects intent conflicts by inferring the intents of the 
pilot and the autopilot. Any disagreements between these two intents are identified as 
intent conflicts. By analyzing how the intents of the pilot and the autopilot change rel-
ative to each other during a conflict, intent conflicts can be divided into four types: 
Type 1: These intent conflicts arise from a momentary deviation of the intent of either 
the pilot or the automation while the other maintains a steady intent before, 
during and after the conflict. When the pilot intent deviates, it is called a Type 
1a conflict while a deviation in the automation intent results in a Type 1b con-
flict. 
Type 2: These intent conflicts arise when both the pilot and the automation make the 
same change in the intent but at different times. Thus, these intent conflicts 
arise from a delayed action of either the pilot or the automation. A delay in 
intent change by the pilot causes a Type 2a conflict while an automation delay 
causes a Type 2b conflict.  
Type 3: These intent conflicts arise when both the pilot and the automation make a 
change in the intent, however, the new intents of the pilot and the automation 
are not the same. 
Type 4: This type of intent conflict is said to have happened when a sequence of the 
previous types of intent conflicts happen in quick succession. 
The examples of each conflict type are presented in Figure 2-2 and the distribution of 




Figure 2-2. Intent conflict types (1: Climb, 0: Constant Altitude, -1: Descend) 
 
Figure 2-3. Distribution of intent conflict types in the vertical dimension 
2.2 Statistical Filtering 
It is discovered that a large number of the intent conflict events are of a very short 
duration and likely to be a result of noise in the data or artifacts of the intent conflict 


































algorithm. A short duration event is highly unlikely to represent a true intent conflict, 
and more likely a spurious data point.  
While the existence of these spurious intent conflicts would not affect the workings 
of the clustering process itself, it may severely skew the results and oversaturate the 
final model with junk clusters. As such a simple duration based statistical cutoff is pro-
posed to filter these short duration events from the data pool. Looking back at the dis-
tribution of the conflict types (Figure 2-3), Type 1 and Type 2 make up the majority of 
the intent conflicts. Type 3 intent conflicts happen too infrequently due to the uncon-
ventional changes in the pilot and autopilot intents. One the other hand, Type 4 intent 
conflicts denote complex combination of intent changes and are also observed relatively 
infrequently. As such, Type 1 and Type 2 intent conflicts are most likely to harbor the 
majority of spurious intent conflict data and thus are of interest for the further filtering 
analysis. 
2.2.1 Duration Analysis of Types 1 & 2 Intent Conflicts in the Vertical Dimension 
The majority of the intent conflicts of Types 1 and 2 persist for a very short duration. 
Figure 2-4 shows the statistical distribution of intent conflict duration across the set of 
tail numbers in the database. It can be seen that for all the cases, the vast majority of 
the intent conflicts are of very short duration and show an exponential-type decay in 
frequency with increasing duration.  
The high frequency of short-duration intent conflicts suggests that these intent con-
flicts may not be ‘true’ intent conflicts but rather artifacts of the intent conflict algo-
rithm and noise. While there is no way to correctly eliminate all the spurious results, 
statistical analysis can be applied to identify an upper bound (cutoff value) in duration 
under which all intent conflicts can be considered as spurious. This filtering process is 
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based on the assumption that short duration intent conflicts are unlikely to be real safety 
critical HMI issues and that it would take a moderate period of time before an HMI 
issue would become dangerous. Similar trends are seen within the horizontal dimen-
sions. The methods discussed here are also applied towards intent conflicts in these 
dimensions.  
 
Figure 2-4. Statistical distribution of the length (in seconds) of intent conflicts in the vertical di-
mension 
2.2.2 Identification of Duration Cutoff 
Since there is a variation in the distribution of intent conflicts in different tail num-
bers, intent conflicts from different tail numbers must be filtered separately to ensure 
statistical consistency. In this section, the process of identifying the cutoff point for 
vertical dimension intent conflicts for Tail #611 is discussed as an example. The process 
12 
 
can be repeated for the rest of the tail numbers in the dataset, and the horizontal dimen-
sion.  
For tail #661, a total of 30,913 intent conflicts were observed in the vertical dimen-
sion. The statistics of these intent conflicts are shown in Table 2-1. Due to the long tail-
type distribution (as shown in Figure 2-4), this data is highly skewed therefore resulting 
in a large difference between the mean and the median and extremely high standard 
deviations.  
To determine an appropriate cutoff value under which the identified intent conflicts 
are considered spurious, we first identify long-duration intent conflicts from the distri-
bution to alleviate the severe skewness. In this analysis, we assume that intent conflicts 
longer than 15 seconds could be caused by pilot-automation interaction issues and result 
in safety problems, and therefore, exclude them in the cutoff value searching process. 
The resulting less skewed distribution is summarized in Table 2-2. 
Table 2-1. Durations statics of intent conflicts in vertical dimension for Tail #661 







1a 2,067 5 70.62 113.42 
1b 610 7 14.64 76.65 
2a 1,933 5 57.66 174.65 
2b 25,888 3 13.26 42.17 
3 82 14 27.62 29.78 
4 333 12 34.40 77.26 
Table 2-2. Durations statics of intent conflicts in vertical dimension for Tail #661  












1a 819 39.62 6 6.38 4.39 
1b 490 80.33 6 6.26 3.76 
2a 1,399 72.37 3 4.38 3.48 




Comparing to the original statistics (as in Table 2-1), the filtered distribution is less 
skewed, and the difference between the mean and median is not severe, which allows a 
better analysis for the cutoff value searching. Due to the top heavy distribution of Type 
2 intent conflicts (see Figure 2-4), the cutoff point was selected to be 2σ above the mean 
value while the cutoff point for Type 1 conflicts was selected to be 1σ above the mean. 
By using these cutoffs, we are able to significantly reduce the number of intent conflicts 
that must be clustered and need to be examined by SMEs.  
Table 2-3. Cutoff duration for vertical dimension Type 1 and 2 intent conflicts of Tail #661 
2.2.3 Example of Filtered Intent Conflict Data 
In Figure 2-5, we show the vertical flight data for a single flight and illustrate how 
the filtering process can eliminate the majority of the spurious intent conflicts. Out of 
the 11 intent conflicts originally detected, only one remained. Figure 2-6 shows the 
detailed view of three intent conflicts among the 11 intent conflicts.   
The first intent conflict shown to the left in Figure 2-6, classified as Type 2b, happens 
due to a delay in the change of the automation’s intent (‘descent’ to ‘altitude hold’) and 
last for a duration of 5 seconds. The pilot’s intent changes from ‘descent’ to ‘altitude 
hold’ as the aircraft approaches the MCP target altitude previously selected. The auto-
mation’s intent is not changed until the VMODE switches from 1 (Altitude Auto) to 2 
(Altitude Hold) when it is finally captured at the selected altitude. It can be concluded 
that this intent conflict is an artifact of the intent conflict detection algorithm where the 
Conflict Type Cutoff Cutoff Duration (seconds) # eliminated % eliminated 
1a ≤ mean + σ 10 643 31.1 
1b ≤ mean + σ 10 412 67.54 
2a ≤ mean + 2σ 11 1,304 67.46 
2b ≤ mean + 2σ 11 20,872 80.62 
- - - 23,231 75.15 
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threshold for the pilot’s autonomous intent change (i.e., from ‘descent’ to ‘altitude 
hold’) affects the magnitude of the delays.  
In the second intent conflict, the pilot selects a new MCP altitude target, causing a 
change in the pilot’s intent from ‘altitude hold’ to ‘descent’. There is a short delay, 2 
seconds, in the change of the automation’s intent. This delay could be due to the time 
needed for the automation to react to the pilot’s command, which is usually short. So, 
it can be concluded that this particular intent conflict is a part of normal operation, and 
thus rightly filtered out. 
In the third intent conflict (highlighted green), the Type 1 intent conflicts lasts for a 
duration of 14 seconds and is a result of the momentary change in the pilot’s intent to 
‘altitude hold’. However, from the altitude and the VMODE data, it can be seen that 
the automation never acknowledged the MCP setting of 2,000 feet and continued de-
scending. The intent conflict ended when the pilot changed the MCP target to 0 ft. Since 
this intent conflict happens right before landing, it is possible that the automation is 
configured for auto-land and not following the pilot’s command. However, using just 




Figure 2-5. Results of the filtering process when applied to a complete flight  




Figure 2-6. Detailed view of intent conflicts shown in Figure 2-5 
From the above analysis, we can see that the spurious intent conflicts (i.e., consid-
ered as an artifact of the intent conflict detection algorithm, or results of normal opera-
tions) can be properly filtered out by the filtering process, and therefore, more interest-
ing and significant intent conflicts get the deserved attention.  
16 
 
2.3 Analysis of Intent Conflicts 
Using the rules defined in the previous section, the cutoff points for different tail 
numbers can be computed, and the size of the intent conflict data can be reduced by 
disregarding the intent conflicts with durations less than the cutoff values, as shown in 
Table 2-4. This results in a significant increase in the number of flights that do not 
exhibit any intent conflicts. In addition, the average number of intent conflicts detected 
in each fight sharply decreases as the result of the filtering process. The change in the 
distribution of the number of intent conflicts per flight is shown in Figure 2-7.  
While a duration based filtering can reduce the number of the intent conflicts that 
need be analyzed, manual analysis by SMEs is still not plausible. The goal of this thesis 
is present a process to systematically analyze the intent conflicts identified in a set of 
FOQA data by the intent conflict detection algorithm. The proposed approach is com-
posed of two parts: First, clustering is used to group similar intent conflicts together 
and systematically reduce the size of the dataset. Second, results from the clustering are 
converted into a data-driven model that characterizes trends in intent conflicts. The 
overall framework of the proposed algorithm is presented in Figure 2-8. 
Table 2-4. Intent conflicts before and after filtering  
 Original Filtered 
Total Flights 151,083 
Intent Conflicts 
Vertical 1,134,737 288,624 
Horizontal 3,189,431 780,830 
Mean intent conflicts 
per flight 
Vertical 7.51 1.95 
Horizontal 21.51 5.17 
Flights with at least 1 conflict 147,885 (97.88%) 118,196 (78.23%) 








Figure 2-8. Overall framework of the proposed approach 
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3. PROPOSED CLUSTERING APPROACH 
Consider a set of initial data points, or in this case intent conflict events, X. Tradi-
tional clustering approaches apply a clustering algorithm Φ to generate the set of solu-
tion clusters λ. While numerous such approaches exist, they are especially limited when 
clustering heterogeneous sets of data made of both continuous and discrete state infor-
mation. Thus we propose a multi-step consensus-based clustering approach. Within a 
consensus based approach, a series of clustering algorithms {Φ(1), Φ(2), … , Φ(𝑁)} are 
applied to generate multiple sets of solution clusters {𝜆(1), 𝜆(2), … , 𝜆(𝑁)}. These solution 
clusters are then processed using a consensus function, 𝛤, to generate the final set of 
solution clusters. The consensus-based approach is thus a multi-step process that com-
bines information from multiple clustering solutions to generate superior results [17].  
The proposed multi-step process can be broken down into three steps: feature anal-
ysis, primary clustering and consensus clustering. The details of the multi-step cluster-




Figure 3-1. Detailed overview of consensus clustering 
3.1 Feature Analysis 
Due to the large number of flight parameters within the FOQA data and the inherent 
uniqueness of each individual flight, it is extremely difficult to cluster and classify the 
intent conflict events using the FOQA data as is. To simplify the dataspace, FOQA data 
corresponding to intent conflict events is abstracted into a set of markers, known as 
features, that characterize the properties of each intent conflict. these features are se-
lected by applying domain knowledge regarding the process used to infer the pilot’s 
and the autopilot’s intents in [16]. As a result of featuring, intent conflict data (𝑒) can 
be represented by a vector of 𝑁 features 𝑒𝑖 = (𝐹𝑖
1, 𝐹𝑖
2, … , 𝐹𝑖
𝑁), where 𝐹𝑖
𝑗
 is the param-
eter value of the 𝑗-th feature for the 𝑖-th data point (i.e. the 𝑖-th identified intent conflict). 
This process greatly reduces the unique nature of the FOQA data for each intent conflict 
and generalizes it in the feature space. As such, millions of unique FOQA data events 
are reduced to a handful of feature based events. 
The features selected for clustering intent conflicts can be categorized as one of the 
following three: intent conflict data features, continuous state features, and discrete 
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state features. The details of each of these feature categories are detailed in the follow-
ing subsections. 
3.1.1 Intent Conflict Features 
Information for features in this category is derived from the result of the intent con-
flict detection algorithm. These features provide information regarding the nature of the 
intent conflict. Features in this category are based on the conclusions drawn by the 
intent conflict algorithm and thus contain information that is not directly present in the 
FOQA data. There are 4 features that are created using this data, as listed in Table 3-1.  
Table 3-1. Features derived from intent conflict data from HMI algorithm 
3.1.2 Continuous Flight Data Features 
These set of features are derived using information from continuous states in the 
FOQA data during the period of the intent conflict. These features provide us with in-
formation regarding the motion of the aircraft when the intent conflict happened. The 
main continuous state features are shown in Table 3-2. 
Feature Description 
Duration 
Represent the length of time of the intent conflict. This feature is used to 
distinguish between intent conflicts that vary in length 
Relative Duration 
Represents the duration of the intent conflict as compared to the length of 
the flight, normalized between 0 and 1. 
Relative Start Time 
Represents the location of the start of the intent conflict based on the 
length of the flight, normalized between 0 and 1. This feature is used to 
identify intent conflicts that occur during specific phases of the flight (ex: 
take-off) 
Conflict Type Discussed in section 1.1 
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Table 3-2. Features derived from continuous state FOQA data 
Data Source Feature 
Pressure Altitude 
Mean Altitude 
Mean Rate of Climb 
Calibrated Air Speed 
Mean Air Speed 
Mean Acceleration 
Heading Angle Mean Turn Rate 
Roll Angle Turn Type (Left/Right) 
3.1.3 Discrete State Features 
These features are built using information regarding the autopilot modes and the pi-
lot’s interactions with the Mode Control Panel (MCP). These features provide insight 
into the actions taken by the pilot and the autopilot that lead to the intent conflict. Dis-
crete state features differ from the previously discussed features in that they do not 
represent measured quantities, instead they are used to track the actions of the pilot and 
the autopilot during the intent conflict. This is done by looking at the sequence of dis-
crete state changes that occur during the intent conflict. Discrete state data is converted 
into features as follows (illustrated in Figure 3-2): 
1. Start Trigger: This denotes the state of the discrete mode immediately prior and 
immediate after the start of the intent conflict. Thus from Figure 3-2, the start 
trigger feature for the illustrated example would be (5-5). 
2. Conflict Sequence: This indicates the sequence of discrete mode changes that 
take place during the conflict. Only instances when the discrete mode changes 
are considered, i.e. the conflict sequence for Figure 3-2 would be (5-2). 
3. Switching Frequency: This presents the total number of discrete state switches 
during an intent conflict divided by the time duration between the first and the 
last switch. Since the conflict sequence abandons time series information regard-
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ing the discrete states, this feature facilitates differencing between intent con-
flicts with rapid discrete state changes and those with more stable discrete state 
changes. The switching frequency of the (5-2) conflict sequence in the example 
would be 0. There must be at least 2 switches, meaning 3 discrete states, for this 
measure to have a non-zero value. 
4. End Trigger: This denotes the discrete mode transition at the end of the intent 
conflict. In the example, the end trigger would be (2-3). 
Both the start and end triggers always contain two discrete state values while the 
length of the conflict sequence can vary depending on the total number of discrete state 
transitions during the period of the intent conflict.  
 
Figure 3-2. Illustration of discrete state information 
The main discrete state data used to create discrete state features is shown in Table 
3-3. In each case, the discrete state sequence is split into the start trigger, the conflict 
sequence and, the end trigger. 
Table 3-3. Data source for discrete state sequence information 
The use of start and end triggers facilitates the clustering analysis based on the type 
of mode switches that initiated or resolved the intent conflict. A discrete state is said to 










Vertical Flight Mode (VMODE) MCP Target Altitude 
Lateral Flight Mode (HMODE) MCP Target Airspeed 
Thrust Mode (TMODE) MCP Target Heading 
Flight Phase - 
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have triggered an intent conflict if the start of an intent conflict is marked by a change 
in that discrete state. Inversely, if a change in a discrete state coincides with the end of 
an intent conflict, it is said to have resolved the intent conflict.  
Table 3-4 shows that the pilot’s action of changing the MCP target altitude results in 
approximately 37% of the intent conflicts in the vertical dimension, compared to 15% 
for VMODE. In comparison, the change in the VMODE is responsible for 85% intent 
conflict resolutions, significantly higher than the 7% for the MCP target altitude. 
Changes in flight phase only result in a minute number of triggers, both start and end. 
This means that a large number of intent conflicts are initiated without any actions from 
the pilot or the autopilot but the majority of them are resolved as a result of their inter-
vention. The majority of intent conflicts also do not contain switches in discrete states 
with only 8% in MCP target altitude, 23% in VMODE and 4% in flight phase. Discrete 
state features can provide a causal relationship between intent conflict events and pilot 
and autopilot actions. The high correlation between discrete state changes and intent 
conflict justifies the use of the proposed discrete state features.  
Table 3-4. Intent conflicts and discrete mode sequences in the vertical dimension  
(1,134,737 total intent conflicts) 
3.1.3.1 Abstraction of MCP Target Sequences 
MCP target sequences (altitude, speed, and heading) represent the discrete actions 
of the pilot. Table 3-5 shows that the number of unique sequence in which the MCP 




Intent conflicts  
resolved 
Intent conflicts w/ 
switching 
MCP Target Altitude 419,877 84,419 88,125 
VMODE 175,035 967,881 265,491 
Flight phase 1157 2467 46,307 
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for autopilot discrete states features. This trend in the data is observed for both MCP 
target airspeed and heading sequences. While the autopilot discrete states switch be-
tween a finite numbers of modes, the pilot is able to select continuous values as a target. 
As a result, a change in the target altitude from 10,000 ft to 6,000 ft is a distinct event 
as compared to the change from 10,000 ft to 7,000 ft.  
Table 3-5. Unique switching events for discrete mode sequences in the vertical dimension  
While it is important to keep as much information as possible in the clustering pro-
cess, to maintain each unique value for the MCP target sequential information would 
be computationally infeasible and create a large number of spurious clusters and actu-
ally degrade the results of the clustering process. The actions taken by the pilot are of 
greater importance than the individual values of different MCP targets. As such, the 
sequential information from the MCP target value is abstracted to represent the action 
taken by the pilot. There were two types of abstraction processes that are considered, a 
simple up-down based abstraction and a level sensitive process.  
3.1.3.1.1 Up-Down Abstraction 
This method converts the MCP target value sequence into a series of (1) and (-1) 
trailing being a 0. The first value of any sequence is assigned the state (0). The state of 
subsequent value is dependent on the previous value. This can be represented as follows 
𝑎𝑖 = 𝑠𝑔𝑛(𝑉𝑖 − 𝑉𝑖−1) (1) 
where, 𝑎𝑖 is abstraction of the i-th value in the sequence of length n, 𝑉𝑖 is the value of 
the i-th element of the sequence of length n 𝑎1 has a value of 0 for all sequences.   
 Unique Start Triggers Unique End Triggers Unique Sequences 
MCP Target Altitude 11,137 6,908 28,245 
VMODE 72 70 748 
Flight phase 18 17 130 
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Thus, using this method, a decrease in the MCP target value is considered as (-1) 
while an increase is denoted with (1). Thus the pilot’s intents can be abstracted to a 
simple go-up/go-down model.  
3.1.3.1.2 Level Sensitive Abstraction 
The Up-Down abstraction only looks at the immediate previous value of the MCP 
target. A more detailed approach is to look at the range of all previous values in the 
sequence and determine the relative levels to which the pilot programed the MCP. As 
with the previous method, the first value in a sequence is automatically assigned a value 
of (0). An increase in value compared to the immediate prior value is assigned a positive 
integer while a decrease is assigned a negative integer. The magnitude and sign of this 
integer can be determined by the following formulation  




𝑆 = 𝑠𝑔𝑛(𝑉𝑖 − 𝑉𝑖−1) (3) 
where, 𝑎𝑖 is abstraction of the i-th value in the sequence of length n, 𝑉𝑖 is the value of 
the i-th element of the sequence of length n, 𝑎1 has a value of 0 for all sequences, and 
𝐻[𝑥] is the Heaviside step function. 
The above algorithm is able to identify the relative increase of the MCP value in 
comparison with the previous levels that have been recorded. While the previous 
method only looks at the generic up/down changes in the MCP target value, resulting 
in a loss of information regarding the multiple levels in the MCP target value change. 
The comparison in the abstracted sequences derived from the application of both meth-
ods can be seen in Table 3-6. Table 3-7 shows that the number of unique sequences can 
be significantly reduced by both methods. This also helps outline the fact that, once 
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abstracted, pilot actions with regards to the MCP target value are significantly less di-
verse as compared to the autopilot actions (see Table 3-5). The use of the level sensitive 
techniques allows us to capture more information regarding the general intentions of 
the pilot. 
Table 3-6. Example of abstraction of MCP altitude target sequences 
Table 3-7. Number of unique sequences in MCP altitude target  
3.2 Primary Clustering  
While it is possible to cluster intent conflict across multiple feature dimensions at 
once, doing so results I n a loss of specificity. Due to the coupled nature of many of the 
flight parameters, a multi-dimensional clustering effort leads to large trivial clusters 
that provide no additional information regarding trends in intent conflict. To circumvent 
this, intent conflicts are separately clustered along each of the 𝑁 features, denoted by  
𝛷(𝑘)(𝑒𝑖) = 𝑙𝑖
𝑘 (4) 
where, Φ(𝑘) is the clustering function employed to cluster data with regards to the 
𝑘-th feature and 𝑙𝑖




𝑘, … , 𝜆𝑚𝑘
𝑘 } (5) 
where, 𝜆𝑗
𝑘 is the cluster label of the 𝑗-th cluster and 𝑚𝑘 is the total number of clusters 
along the 𝑘-th feature created by Φ(𝑘). 
MCP Target Altitude  Up-Down Abstraction Level Sensitive Abstraction 
10,000→7,000→8,000 0→-1→1→-1 0→-1→1→-2 
10,000→7,000→11,000 0→-1→1→-1 0→-1→2→-2 
10,000→7,000→11,000→9,000 0→-1→1→-1 0→-1→2→-2 
Original Sequence Up-Down Abstraction Level Sensitive Abstraction 
28,245 22 31 
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Based on the characteristics of each feature, different clustering algorithms must be 
used. For the features used within the scope of this work, one of these three techniques 
is used; DBSCAN [19], Jenks Natural Breaks [20] or k-median [21]. The DBSCAN 
takes a density based approach to clustering and is employed to cluster both continuous 
and discrete state features. Due to its ability to handle oddly shaped distribution, the 
DBSCAN is found to be an effective technique to generate the primary clusters. In the 
Jenks Natural Breaks approach, originally developed to be used in cartography, an it-
erative process is applied to evaluate different breaks within the data and cluster the 
data to achieve the smallest in class variance. This approach is used to cluster the intent 
conflict duration feature, values for which exhibit an exponential distribution with a 
heavy tail. The k-median clustering algorithm is used to cluster the two normalized 
time-based features; whose values range from 0 to 1. Note that a median based approach 
was selected over k-means [22] to create clusters that are more compact. 
Intent conflict events can now be represented by the cluster labels along 𝑁 features 
rather than the original parameter value of the feature; 𝑒𝑖 = (𝑙𝑖
1, 𝑙𝑖
2, … , 𝑙𝑖
𝑁). A primary 
cluster is then defined as the set of intent conflict events that share the same feature 
labels across all the features as:  
𝑃𝐶𝑘 = {𝑒 ∈ 𝐸|𝑒𝑖 = 𝑒𝑗 , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1,2, … , |𝐸|}} (6) 
where 𝐸 is the set of all intent conflicts and |𝐸| is the cardinality of 𝐸. Then the set of 
primary clusters is: 
𝑃𝐶 = {𝑃𝐶1, 𝑃𝐶2, 𝑃𝐶3, … , 𝑃𝐶𝑀},
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑃𝐶𝑖 ∩ 𝑃𝐶𝑗 = ∅, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝑀] 
(7) 
where 𝑀 is the total number of primary clusters. 
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Each primary cluster represents a set of intent conflict events that have comparable 
features, that is events within the same primary cluster occur under a limited spread in 
flight parameters. The primary clustering in and by itself is able to aggregate intent 
conflicts based on their general flight parameters. However, if we were to stop here, it 
would result in clusters which are too specific for our use. Intent conflicts contained 
within each primary cluster only apply to a limited range of flight conditions. This out-
come is the opposite of what is obtained when clustering across multiple feature dimen-
sions; which, as noted above, caused a total loss of specificity. To find a balance be-
tween these two outcomes, we use consensus clustering to aggregate the results of the 
primary clusters.  
3.2.1 Distance Measure for Discrete Sequences 
The discrete state sequences hold critical information regarding the pilot and autopi-
lot actions during an intent conflict and must be accounted for in the clustering process. 
The DBSCAN method usually uses Euclidian distances to cluster the input dataset 
which are not appropriate for measuring the distance between a set of discrete state 
sequences. As such, a new technique based on pattern matching is proposed to measure 
the distance between two discrete sequences. In the vertical domain, the discrete se-
quences include the VMODE sequence, flight phase sequence and the MCP target alti-
tude sequence associated with an intent conflict.  
A popular technique used to find similarities between discrete state sequences is the 
Longest Common Subsequence (LCS) approach [23]. While this approach was initially 
considered, the LCS algorithm views non-continuous sequences as valid subsequence 
solutions. For example, as per the LCS approach the longest subsequence between the 
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sequences ‘AXBYCZ’ and ‘XYZ’ is the subsequence ‘XYZ” with a length of 3. How-
ever, when looking at discrete sequences within intent conflicts themselves, it is more 
important to analyze the series of continuous actions that were taken during an intent 
conflict.  
The Levenshtein distance [24] is a popular measure that is used in computer science 
to identify the minimum number of changes required to convert one string (i.e. sequence 
of characters) to another. This method can be applied to find the distance between a 
pair of discrete state sequences. However, the Levenshtein distance is unable to take 
into consideration the existence of repeated sequence of characters and is better suited 
when the sequences are of similar lengths.  
Another technique that was considered is the BLAST algorithm [25], used to match 
nucleotide sequences. This algorithm works by using a library shortened query se-
quences that can be compared between the input string and its internal library. While 
this process is effective even for extremely large sequence, it is excessive for the shorter 
sequence (shorter compared to the length of nucleotides) that are encountered in this 
case. This approach is able to account for repetition in discrete states.  
A new method is therefore proposed to calculate the distance between two discrete 
state sequences. This distance between two sequences can be considered as the measure 
of similarity in the actions taken within the sequences. This can be used to quantify how 
similar the response of the pilot or the automation was under a given intent conflict. 





Figure 3-3. Distance measure algorithm for discrete sequences 
The algorithm attempts to identify all the exclusive alignments that exist between 
the two sequences. An exclusive alignment is defined as a match between sequences 1 
and 2 such that the elements in sequence 1 currently aligned have not previously aligned 
to elements in sequence 2. If there exist two positions where the same elements in se-
quence 1 align with a set of elements in sequence 2, then the shorter of the two positions 
is discarded. This technique prohibits multiple matching of the elements in sequence 1 
to elements in sequence 2, while still allowing for repeated sequences. Once all the 
unique positions have been identified, distance between the two sequences can then be 
calculated using 









where, 𝑛 is number of exclusive matches between sequence 1 and sequence 2, 𝑙𝑖 is 
the length of the matched sequence 𝑖, and 𝐿1 and 𝐿2 are the lengths of sequence 1 and 
sequence 2 respectively. 
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Using this measure, the distances between a few samples of the VMODE sequences 
are computed as shown in Table 3-8. A shorter distance signifies that the actions taken 
in the two cases have a high level of similarity. The value for this measure can vary 
from 0 to 1, where 0 signifies an exact match while 1 represents a complete mismatch. 
Table 3-8. Sample discrete sequence distances (smaller is closer) 
Looking back at the LCS approach and let us consider the sequences (1-2-3-4-5-6) 
and (1-2-3). The distance between these 2 sequences using the LCS subsequence ap-
proach and the proposed distance algorithm would be 0.5. Now consider the sequences 
(1-2-3-4-5-6) and (1-3-5), the LCS approach would still give a subsequence match of 3 
and thus a distance of 0.5. However, the proposed approach results in three individual 
matches of length 1 and consequently a distance of 0.167.  
3.3 Consensus Clustering 
Let us consider an example where data is clustered along three features, with each 
feature being grouped into two clusters, and forming three primary clusters. The result 
of this primary clustering can be envisioned as a hypergraph, with the three primary 







3}) as the edges, as illustrated in Figure 3-4. In this figure, primary 
cluster 𝑃𝐶1 is assigned to cluster 𝜆1
1 along the first feature, 𝜆2
2 along the second feature 
Sequence 1 Sequence 2 Distance 
787017870 13232 1 
787017870 78 0.4444 
787017870 787 0.3333 
787017870 7870 0.1111 
787017870 78701 0.0889 




3 along the third; and therefore lies within the intersection of the edges represent-
ing those three clusters.  
 
Figure 3-4. Illustration of primary clusters as a hypergraph 
The consensus function is the algorithm that operates on this hypergraph to create 
consensus clusters.  One such consensus function would be to use hypergraph partition-
ing (HGP) by cutting a subset of the edges and thus dividing the hypergraph [17, 26, 
27]. However, this approach is most effective when the desired number of clusters is 
known and are of similar size. As this assumption cannot be made, we reframe the 
hypergraph as a similarity matrix. Within this similarity matrix, the pairwise similarity 
between the 𝑖-th and the 𝑗-th primary clusters is the cardinality of the intersection of the 





𝜆 is the set containing the cluster labels shared by the intent conflict events 















3}| and is equal to 1. The values in the sim-
ilarity matrix represent the number of feature labels that the primary clusters share. 
Since similarity is not directional, i.e. 𝑆𝑖𝑗 = 𝑆𝑗𝑖, the similarity matrix is symmetric.  
Using this, it is possible to construct the similarity matrix for the primary clusters. 
The consensus function used in this thesis is a matrix partitioning algorithm that divides 
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this similarity matrix into consensus clusters, illustrated in Figure 3-5. Specifically, we 
apply an iterative k-medoids method to partition the similarity matrix into consensus 
clusters [27, 28]. The k-medoids clustering method then generates consensus clusters 
by grouping together similar primary clusters.  
 
Figure 3-5. Illustration of the partitioning of the similarity matrix into consensus clusters 
The output of the clustering process is consensus clusters with each consensus clus-
ter containing a set of primary clusters. Data within each of these consensus clusters 
represent events that are similar to each other and dissimilar to those in other clusters. 
The intent conflict events making up the primary clusters within a consensus cluster 
show a high level of agreement with each other and are said to have high consensus. 
When two intent conflict events have high consensus, most of their features will be 
similar to each other; that is, the two intent conflicts will describe comparable flight 
characteristics. However, simply putting such events together does not yield any insight 
into the nature of the consensus clusters. To solve this, we propose using the results of 
the consensus algorithm to build a data driven model that can systematically represent 




4. DATA-DRIVEN MODEL 
This modeling process is built around the notion of expressing consensus clusters as 
networks. The structure of these networks provides an intuitive understanding of the 
relationships between the intent conflicts represented by a consensus cluster. Once this 
network has been created, its contents can be generalized by a representative event. 
This approach also allows the model to be efficiently updated when new data is avail-
able.  
4.1 Clusters as Networks 
Each consensus cluster is created by partitioning a large similarity matrix, and thus 
each of them has a similarity matrix associated with themselves. This similarity matrix 
can be converted into a dissimilarity matrix by a simple transformation. The dissimi-
larity matrix denotes how far away the events within a consensus cluster are from each 
other.  
Figure 4-1 shows the matrices associated with a consensus cluster, of 7 primary clus-
ters labeled A-G as an example. Assume that, when performing consensus clustering, a 
total of 12 features are used, making 12 the maximum possible value within the simi-
larity matrix. The dissimilarity matrix is the similarity matrix with its values subtracted 
from this maximum value of 12, i.e. 𝔻ij = 12 − 𝕊ij , where 𝔻ij and 𝕊ij denote the ele-
ment in the i-th row and the j-th column of 𝔻 and 𝕊, respectively. The dissimilarity 
matrix is always 0 along its diagonal and also is symmetric. 
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The dissimilarity matrix can then be transformed to a weighted adjacency matrix by 
setting all the non-zero values in a row above the minimum non-zero value in the same 
row to zero, thereby only preserving the nearest connections. This adjacency matrix is 
used to generate a networked graph, as shown in Figure 4-2, which better shows the 
relations between different primary clusters within a consensus cluster. All the intent 
conflicts within a consensus cluster already have high consensus with each other, but 
by looking only at the closest set of relationship a clearer picture of the connections 
within the consensus cluster can be realized. 
 
Figure 4-1. Similarity, dissimilarity and adjacency matrices of a sample consensus cluster 
 
Figure 4-2. Graph plot for the sample consensus cluster in Figure 4-1 
4.2 Representative Event 
The goal of this work is to ensure that intent conflicts are clustered to enable efficient 
analysis by SMEs. The intent conflicts grouped within a consensus cluster can be de-
scribed as a set of events that are similar to each other along most of the features. From 
Figure 4-2, we can say that events in primary cluster B are a variation of events in C 
which are a variation of events in A which are a variation of events in F, and so on. The 
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distance between two nodes, i.e. weight of the edges along the shortest path between 
them, determines the number of features along which events within those nodes vary. 
By the concept of variations, we can identify the dominant node (i.e., primary clus-
ter) within a consensus cluster. The dominant node is defined as one with the least 
amount of dissimilarity to the rest of the nodes in the network. Within a consensus 
cluster, the dominant node is selected as the one with the lowest centrality score as 
defined by,  
𝑤𝑖 = 𝜖(𝑖) ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝑗
 (10) 
where 𝑗 ranges from 1 to the size of the dissimilarity matrix, and 𝜖(𝑖) is the eccentricity 
of the 𝑖-th node and is defined as the greatest geodesic distance between node 𝑖 and any 
other node. The summation term in Eq. (10) is used to calculate the total dissimilarity 
a node has within the network. The eccentricity term is used to weigh nodes that mini-
mize the radius of the graph more favorably. The radius of the graph is equal to the 
minimum eccentricity of the nodes in a network. For example, in Figure 4-2 the nodes 
A, D, E, and F have an eccentricity of 2, while nodes B, C, and G have an eccentricity 
of 3. Thus the radius of this graph is 2. A lower eccentricity score indicates that a node 
is closer to the center of the graph, defined as the set of nodes with the minimum ec-
centricity. Thus in this case, while nodes A, D, E and F are at the center of the graph; 
however, since node A has the minimum total dissimilarity, it is the dominant node. In 
the case where multiple nodes have the minimum centrality score, the size of a node 
(i.e. the number of intent conflicts represented by that primary cluster) is used as a tie-
breaker for selecting the dominant node.  
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Even though a consensus cluster represents events grouped non-quantitatively, using 
the above measure, we can identify the most dominant node within the consensus clus-
ter. The intent conflict events that are clustered within the dominant node, are said to 
be the representative events of the consensus cluster. The rest of the intent conflicts 
within the consensus cluster are considered to be variations of these representative 
events. The representative events showcase the general properties of the intent conflicts 
within a consensus cluster and therefore the general flight condition under which the 
events in that consensus cluster occur. The variations from the representative events 
can be considered as instances when the representative intent conflict occurred but un-
der slightly different flight conditions (for example, at a different altitude).  
This process effectively represents the results of consensus clusters, facilitating the 
simpler analysis of the information consolidated within a consensus cluster. While ex-
amining intent conflicts, the properties of the representative event can be reviewed first 
to gauge the general characteristics of the consensus cluster. Then, if necessary, the rest 
of the variations may be examined. The networked consensus clusters and their repre-
sentative property together create a data driven model for intent conflicts.  
4.3 Model Update 
It is important that the model proposed in the previous section can be updated when 
new flight data is available, to account for the emergence of new variations in known 
intent conflicts, entirely new types of intent conflicts, or simply an increase in frequency 
of a particular type of intent conflict. The clustering approach employed in this thesis 
and the subsequent definition of a model make it simple and efficient to perform this 
update. This update process is carried out in the following three steps. First, the value 
for each of the features of the new data point is compared to the existing feature clusters. 
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For each feature, if the new value is within the parameters of an existing cluster, it is 
assigned the corresponding cluster label without the need to perform clustering along 
that feature. When this happens, it is said that the value for that particular feature was 
previously observed by the model. When the feature of the new data point does not fall 
in the limits of the existing feature clusters, a new cluster is formed around the new data 
point. In this manner, new data does not modify the contents or structure of an existing 
feature cluster. 
Second, based on its feature cluster labels, the new data point is assigned to a primary 
cluster. If the new data point has the same cluster labels as an existing primary cluster, 
it is said to be a known event and the corresponding primary and consensus clusters are 
updated to include it. If this is not the case, a new primary cluster is created and the 
overall similarity matrix updated. However, it is not necessary to re-partition the entire 
similarity matrix. The partitioning of the similarity matrix creates consensus clusters 
that maximize internal similarity, so partitioning the entire updated similarity matrix 
will only result in a different solution for those consensus clusters that are highly similar 
to the new primary cluster. Therefore, only the consensus clusters that have a high sim-
ilarity with this new primary cluster need to be reformed, which is a desirable property 
from the computational complexity point of view 
Third, the model is updated to reflect any changes in the structure or the size of the 
new consensus clusters. This update process may result in modifying, combining or 
expanding the existing consensus clusters. Any changes to a consensus clusters also 
trigger a revaluation of the dominant node in order to ensure that a consensus cluster is 
represented correctly. An example of how a model may be updated with new intent 
conflict data is discussed in the next subsection.  
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4.3.1 Model Update Example 
Table 4-1 shows the features of an example intent conflict that is to be checked 
against the model built using the intent conflict data from tail #661. These features 
represent an intent lag conflict (Type 1) occurring when the autopilot enters the altitude 
capture mode when descending towards a given altitude.  
When this intent conflict is compared to the model, it is found that only one of the 
features (VMODE Sequence) is unknown to the model. While this exact intent conflict 
event has never been observed by the model, the model does contain knowledge re-
garding which primary clusters some of the features (in this case, all except VMODE 
sequence) belong within. As such, only VMODE Sequence must be clustered to iden-
tify its native primary cluster.  
In this case, the clustering process identifies that the unknown VMODE Sequence 
lies within the same cluster as the VMODE sequence 1→3. This relation is due to the 
small ‘distance’ between the two discrete sequences (as defined by the discrete se-
quence distance algorithm).  
Since the clusters for the entire feature space have been identified, they are used to 
build consensus and the intent conflict can be assigned to a primary cluster. In this case, 
this new event has complete consensus with the existing cluster as shown in Table 4-1. 
Thus, even though the event described was not previously recorded, it was possible to 
classify it within an existing cluster and find a complete consensus with existing events. 
In this case, a model updated the properties of a consensus cluster without changing the 













1→1 (Altitude Auto) 








TMODE 10 – Constant Speed Mode Known 10 
Phase 6 – Descent Mode Known 6 
MCP Target Altitude Sequence Constant Known Constant 
Speed Target Value Sequence Constant Known Constant 
Pilot Trigger Descent → Hold Known Descent → Hold 
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5. DEMONSTRATION OF PROPOSED ALGORITHMS WITH 
FOQA DATASET 
The algorithms proposed in this thesis were applied to the FOQA data from 151,083 
flights in the NASA’s DASHlink database. For each flight, intent conflicts were first 
detected by applying the intent conflict detection algorithm proposed in [16]. The de-
tected intent conflicts were then analyzed by our proposed approach, with the results of 
those analysis discussed in this section. The results are presented in a manner that 
demonstrates the capabilities and effectiveness of the proposed approach.  
5.1 Trends in Intent Conflicts 
Intent conflicts detected in the vertical/speed and horizontal/speed (H/S) dimensions 
were processed using our approach, and the results of which are shown in Table 5-1. 
Intent conflicts in the V/S dimension are detected based on the movement of the aircraft 
in the longitudinal plane while those in the H/S dimension based on motion in the lateral 
plane.  
By looking at the distribution of intent conflicts along different features, it is possible 
to identify overarching trends regarding their behavior. Figure 5-1 shows that intent 
conflicts in the vertical/speed (V/S) dimension are highly prevalent during the descent 
stage of the flight. Additionally, Figure 5-2 shows the distribution on V/S intent con-
flicts over the duration of the flight. In this case, as expected a peak is observed towards 
the end of the flight. Both of this behavior is in agreement with industry surveys that 
42 
 
conclude that aviation accidents are concentrated during Final Approach and Landing 
[29]. 
Intent conflicts in the H/S dimensions are almost evenly distributed across the three 
major phases in flight, as shown in Figure 5-3. Furthermore, while H/S intent conflicts 
are slightly more prevalent during the beginning and the end of a flight as seen in Figure 
5-4; the distribution doesn’t contain high concentrations in specific regions of the flight 
as is the case with intent conflicts in the V/S dimensions.  
 




Figure 5-2. Distribution of V/S intent conflicts by normalized flight time 
 




Figure 5-4. Distribution of H/S intent conflicts by normalized flight time 
5.2 Data Reduction  
The objective of the clustering process is to systematically reduce the size of data 
that must be analyzed by SMEs. To demonstrate the capabilities of our approach, we 
applied the proposed algorithms to intent conflicts detected in the aforementioned data 
set.  
Each step of the clustering process significantly reduces the size of the data, with the 
ultimate size being orders of magnitude smaller than the initial dataset. In the V/S di-
mension a total of 288,624 intent conflicts were detected in a dataset of 151,083 flights. 
Within the proposed multi-step clustering process, each step of the process was able to 
reduce the results of the previous step with consensus clustering compressing the num-
ber down to 74 by the final step. Consequently, instead of attempting to analyze a few 
hundred thousand events, SMEs only need to analyze only 74 clusters to identify HMI 
related intent conflicts. Similar results were obtained by analyzing intent conflicts from 
the same flight data in the H/S dimension.  
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Table 5-1. Data reduction capability of proposed clustering approach 
5.3 Properties of Identified Consensus Clusters 
In this section, we will outline some of the insights a consensus cluster can provide 
into the nature of intent conflict events. For brevity, we will focus on the results from 
the analysis of intent conflicts in the V/S dimension. Table 5-2 lists the properties of a 
few of the 74 consensus clusters that were created by the proposed clustering process. 
By looking at this table, it is possible to infer the type of intent conflicts that each of 
the consensus cluster represents.  
The consistency of a consensus cluster is the percentage of feature labels that are 
identical across all the intent conflicts within that consensus cluster. The consistent fea-
tures of a consensus cluster represent the features and the associated parameter values 
that are always observed when that type of intent conflict occurs. Consequently, these 
consistent parameters can be viewed as the circumstance in flight that triggers that in-
tent conflict. Clusters with low consistency represent intent conflict events that may 
occur in a range of flight conditions while those with high consistency suggest that 
specific things must occur for that type of intent conflict to happen. The number of 
primary clusters in a consensus cluster represent the total number of variations of the 
intent conflict in the consensus cluster. This measure provides insight into the width of 
variations that still facilitate the intent conflict. Features that vary within a consensus 
 Vertical/Speed Horizontal/Speed 
 Size of events % of original Size of events % of original 
Intent Conflicts 1,134,737 100% 3,189,431 100% 
Filtered Events 288,624 25.43% 780,830 24.48% 
Featured Events 2,984 0.26% 3,217 0.10% 
Primary Clusters 641 0.0056% 918 0.0031% 
Consensus Clusters 74 0.000065% 92 0.000029% 
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clusters indicate that the occurrence of an intent conflict may not be dependent on those 
features. 
Table 5-2.  Properties of consensus clusters on V/S intent conflicts 
Using this, we can infer properties about different consensus clusters. For example, 
the consensus clusters that do not show variation along the altitude feature (30, 50, 60, 
70 in Table 5-2) represent intent conflicts that only happen within a fixed range of alti-
tudes. Subsequently, the consensus clusters that show a variation in flight phase but not 
altitude (30, 50) represent intent conflicts that occur in situations where there is a 
change in flight phase, such as transitions in and out of cruise. By looking at consensus 
clusters as such, it is possible to deduce which consensus clusters could represent intent 
conflicts of an interesting nature.  
Consensus Clusters  
Feature 
Consistency 
# of Primary 
Clusters 









Relative Start Time 
Consensus Cluster 2 66% 34 36,781 
Altitude 
MCP Altitude Target 
Flight Phase 
Relative Start Time 
Consensus Cluster 30 75% 12 7,123 
MCP Alt Target 
TMODE 
Flight Phase 
Consensus Cluster 40 83% 7 1,146 
Altitude 
VMODE 
Consensus Cluster 50 83% 3 121 
MCP Altitude Target 
Flight Phase 
Consensus Cluster 53 83% 6 87 
Altitude 
Duration 
Consensus Cluster 60 100% 1 5 - 
Consensus Cluster 70 100% 1 1 - 
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5.4 Benefits of the Proposed Network Structure 
In this subsection, we will showcase how a consensus cluster can be effectively vis-
ualized as a network. Once the details of the consensus cluster are identified, the net-
work structure can be annotated as in Figure 5-5. By doing so, the relations between 
the different features and primary clusters can be more clearly seen. For example, in 
Figure 5-5, we can see how variations from the representative cluster, A, occur due to 
variations in three different features. The network graph provides us with a visual tool 
to understand how events within a consensus cluster relate to one and other.  
 
Figure 5-5. Network graph of a consensus cluster 
5.5 Details of Clustered Intent Conflicts 
In this subsection, we will analyze some of consensus clusters by looking at their 
representative events. In each case, we will describe the conditions in flight that lead to 
the intent conflicts. The proposed approach will demonstrate its ability to effectively 
create cohesive clusters that provide valuable insight into their contents.   
5.5.1 Example 1: Representative Intent Conflict of V/S Consensus Cluster 53 
There are a total of 87 intent conflicts within this consensus cluster. The intent con-
flicts occur because there is a change in the autopilot intent from altitude hold (0) to 
descend (-1), while the pilot maintains an altitude hold intent. This intent conflict is 
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initiated by a change in the autopilot VMODE as the aircraft begins to descend. Events 
within the consensus clusters vary due to altitude (mean of 2,000 ft and 4,000 ft) and 
the length (mean of 45 seconds, 104 seconds and 186 seconds). In each case, the pilot 
does not interact with the MCP and the autopilot switches TMODE from Speed Hold 
(10) to Auto Throttle OFF (0) during the intent conflict. In addition, the autopilot makes 
a series of VMODE changes of type shown in Figure 5-6. It is this series of VMODE 
changes that make the events within this particular cluster of interest.  
The autopilot VMODEs are defined as follows: 1-Altitude Auto, 2-Altitude Hold, 7-
Flare, 8-Land. During this intent conflict, the aircraft is making its final descent towards 
the runway. Upon performing a review of standard landing operations within the data 
set, the observed VMODE behavior for events within this consensus cluster is signifi-
cantly different from a nominal approach, shown in Figure 5-9. In addition, by looking 
at the start time of the intent conflicts normalized against the flight time, it can be seen 
that intent conflicts within this consensus cluster happen almost exclusively during the 
end stages of the flight, as shown in Figure 5-8.  
We believe that events within this consensus cluster are of interest due to the rarity 





Figure 5-6. Flight parameters of a representative intent conflict for Consensus Cluster 53 in the 
V/S dimension 
 




Figure 5-8. Normalized location of intent conflicts from Consensus Cluster 53 during the flight 
5.5.2 Example 2: Intent Conflict of V/S Consensus Cluster 70 
Consensus cluster 70 consists of a single primary cluster containing a single intent 
conflict, the details of which are shown in Figure 5-9. No other variations of this intent 
conflict were observed within the dataset. The intent conflict begins when the pilot 
starts making small changes to the MCP target altitude. These changes are being made 
while the aircraft is descending for landing. These small changes made by the pilot 
initiate an autopilot response for both the vertical and thrust modes. The autopilot per-
forms a series of vertical mode switches, described in Figure 5-9. In addition, the thrust 
mode also switches from Auto Throttle OFF (0) to Speed Hold (10). The rapid switch-
ing of modes suggests automation taking actions in an attempt to reach a stable state. 
This situation also poses a potential danger as it occurs as just prior to landing.  
It was found that the problem described by this intent conflict is indeed a known 
HMI issue that results from pilot error [30]. This intent conflict occurred when the pilot 
paused while turning the dial to set a missed approach altitude, which resulted in the 
autopilot intermittently switching to Altitude Hold mode. This problem is described in 
[30] as “Altitude Capture while Setting Missed Approach Altitude”. This example 
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showcases that the proposed approach is able to identify, differentiate, and isolate a 
singular event, in an unsupervised manner, within a dataset of 288,624 events.  
 
Figure 5-9. Flight parameters of the intent conflict in Consensus Cluster #70 in the V/S dimen-
sion 
5.5.3 Example 3: Representative Intent Conflict of V/S Consensus Cluster 30 
Looking at the flight parameters during the intent conflict in the representative event, 
the conflict occurs due to a delay in the autopilot following the pilot’s intent of reducing 
altitude. As shown in Figure 5-10, while the aircraft is in cruise at a constant altitude 
the pilot lowers the MCP target altitude to 24,000 ft (down from 28,000 ft). There is a 
delay in the autopilot switching from Altitude Hold (VMODE 2) to Altitude Auto 
(VMODE 1). The autopilot’s intent change happens after a significant period, 240 sec-
ond, from when the pilot sets the MCP target. This long duration of the intent conflict 
distinguishes this consensus cluster from other more common delay-type events. An-
other observation is that there do not exist variations in the altitude, as such the intent 
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conflicts described within this consensus cluster happen at similar altitudes (approxi-
mately 27,000 ft to 31,000 ft). Using this information, it can be concluded that the intent 
conflict described by this consensus cluster is of a specific nature and happens when 
the aircraft begins its descent from cruise.  
Upon discussion of such events with pilots, it was determined that these type of in-
tent conflicts could be occurring due to the pilot preemptively selecting a MCP altitude 
target without engaging it. Since the engagement information is not available in the 
FOQA data, it is not possible to account for this during the intent inference. However, 
the consensus clustering process is able to separate out this apparent intent conflict due 
to normal operating procedures.  
 
Figure 5-10. Flight parameters of a representative intent conflict for Consensus Cluster 30 in the 
V/S dimension 
5.5.4 Discussion of Consensus Clusters 
The intent conflict detection algorithm uses intent inference to identify HMI issues 
[16]. The algorithm detects intent conflict instances in flight that could potentially be a 
53 
 
result of a HMI issue, however this is not always the case. Many of the identified con-
sensus cluster were found to not represent an HMI issue but instead represent a false 
positive due to noise or lack of some information in the data. The clustering approach 
proposed in this thesis is capable of separating these false intent conflicts from the true 
HMI issues.  
Consider consensus cluster 30 from Table 5-2, upon analysis it was found that the 
events within this consensus cluster were a result of a normal operation procedure that 
cannot be captured by the information currently available in FOQA data. The intent 
conflicts within this cluster represented a long duration (> 2 minutes) delay in the au-
topilot engaging when the pilot changes the MCP altitude target. The pilot tactically 
sets the new altitude target before he actually intends to descend and engages this alti-
tude change at latter time; resulting in an apparent HMI issue stemming from a delay 
in action by the autopilot. Since the button press action to engage a new MCP target is 
not recorded in the FOQA data, it is not possible to account for this in the pilot’s intent 
model and thus it is erroneously identified as an intent conflict by the intent conflict 
detection algorithm.  
Events contained within consensus cluster 1 are also falsely identified as HMI issues 
that result from the approximations made within the intent conflict detection algorithm. 
The process of inferring the pilot intent uses a 120 ft bound around the target altitude, 
a necessity to account for noise in the data. As such, the pilot intent is preemptively set 
to Altitude Hold when the aircraft descends within this bounds but before it levels out, 
leading to a falsely detected intent conflict. Consensus cluster 2 represents events of a 
comparable situation except when the aircraft is climbing instead of descending. 
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It is crucial to differentiate that while the events represented within a consensus clus-
ter may not be true HMI issues, the consensus clusters themselves are not invalid. Ul-
timately, we can conclude that the proposed approach is indeed capable of segregating 
different types of intent conflicts into consistent clusters. By analyzing large clusters 
representing false intent conflicts, SMEs can discard significant numbers of events in 
bulk. True HMI events and intent conflicts are rare events that are not expected to occur 
with a high frequency.  The proposed algorithm is effectively able to both identify 
events that occur rarely, as described in the previous two examples, while still account-
ing for large clusters that represent false HMI events.  
5.6 Model Validation 
The model is validated to check its ability to categorize intent conflicts and improve 
as it is updated with new data. An intent conflict data point is considered to be ‘known’ 
if it’s features have been previously observed within the model and thus it can be in-
stantly categorized. An intent conflict is ‘unknown’ if it’s features are not part of the 
model and the model must update itself to identify how to categorize this new event.  
The FOQA dataset being used contains information from 35 aircraft identified with 
their tail numbers. An initial model was generated by using data from tail number #661. 
This model was then updated in 2 steps, first with data from flights of tail #662 and 
then tail #663. The knowledge of each model was tested with flight data from the re-
mainder of the tail numbers, the result of this are shown in Figure 5-11. When the intent 
conflict model is created using flight data from just tail number #661, it is capable of 
directly categorizing about 90% of the intent conflicts from the rest of the tail numbers. 
Upon updating this model with data from tail #662, we can increase this rate up to 92% 
and then close to 95% when intent conflict data from tail #663 is integrated.  
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From Figure 5-11, it can be seen that the model’s ability to categorize events varies 
from across the different tail numbers. For example, in the first case when the model is 
created with data from only tail #661, tail #657 and 685 have a much lower rate of 
recognition with the model than others. Upon integration of the data from tail #662, the 
rate for #657 rises closer to the average. Intent conflicts observed in the data from tail 
#662 also occurred in the flights of tail #657; thus when data from tail #662 is added to 
the model, the model’s effectiveness in categorizing events from tail #657 increases. 
For the flights from tail #685, the rate remains consistently lower than the average even 
after the model is updated twice. This actually provides the insight that intent conflicts 
occurring in the flights of that aircraft are of a potentially unique nature and of perspec-
tive interest.    
The effectiveness of a data driven model is a direct consequence of the quality of the 
initial training data used. The proposed data driven model is able to categorize intent 
conflicts based on its existing knowledge. As the model is updated with more infor-
mation, it has been shown that the model’s ability to categorize intent conflict, i.e. its 
knowledge, grows.  
 




In this thesis, we have developed a clustering and modeling algorithm to categorize 
identified intent conflict events within large-scale Flight Operational Quality Assurance 
(FOQA) dataset, to provide Subject Matter Experts a tool which enable efficient and 
effective analysis of such events that would represent Human Machine Interaction 
(HMI) issues. A multi-step clustering process has been proposed to cluster the intent 
conflict data. The results of this clustering are then converted to an updateable model 
with each cluster structured into a network. By applying this approach to a large-scale 
FOQA dataset, it has been demonstrated that the proposed algorithm can create useful 
clusters that can significantly simplify the analysis process. The model generated from 
this process has shown to be able to identify intent conflicts based on its internal 
knowledge and improve when updated with new data. Finally, it should be noted that 
while the algorithms presented in this thesis has been developed for the analysis of 
FOQA data, the underlying framework is domain agnostics and could be used in other 
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